THOUGHTS

ON THE

NAVAL STRENGTH

OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE.

PART II.

TENDING TO POINT OUT WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME FOR A SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

" Nec tamen hæ clades, defectioneſque ſociorum moverunt,
" et pacis unquam mentio apud Romanos fieret; neque ante
" conſulis Romam adventum, nec poſtquam is rediit, renova-
" vitque memoriam acceptæ cladis: quo in tempore, ipſo adeo
" magno animo civitas fuit, ut conſuli ex tanta clade, cujus
" ipſe cauſa maxima fuiſſet, redeunti, et obviam itum, frequen-
" ter ab omnibus ordinibus fit, *et gratiæ actæ quod de republica*
" *non deſperaſſet.*"

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TRIUMPHS

OF THE

NAVAL STRUCTURE

OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

ON a former occaſion, I ventured to communicate to the public, ſuch obſervations as occurred to me, relative to the natural advantages poſſeſſed by Great Britain, for the acquiſition of naval power; with a ſhort account of the principal gallant actions, which, prior to the commencement of the laſt war, had been performed at ſea by the natives of this country.

It has ſince been ſuggeſted, that it might not be an improper ſubject of inveſtigation, to inquire how far the obſtacles, which are commonly urged againſt any farther increaſe of our navy, namely, the ſuppoſed difficulty of procuring more ſhips and more ſeamen, are well founded: And

And as examining ſuch a queſtion cannot poſſibly do any harm; and as ſome ideas may be thrown out, which, in the hands of abler and more experienced men, may be attended with ſervice to the public; I was induced to hazard the following addition to the former publication.

THOUGHTS,

THOUGHTS, &c.

THE reports which have been lately circulating of an approaching peace, induced me to examine a very curious and important political paper, intitled "AN HISTORICAL MEMORIAL OF THE NEGOTIATION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND, "FROM THE 26th MARCH TO THE 20th "SEPTEMBER, 1761." It is tranſlated from a French original, which was publiſhed by the court of France, with a view of proving, that every ſtep was taken at that time, conſiſtent with the dignity of an independent power, to procure an accommodation. The ſplendid ſucceſs which had attended the arms of Great Britain, and the low ſtate to which France was reduced, are too well known to require any particular recital. Yet the memorial alluded to (near the concluſion) contains this judicious and well-founded obſervation, "They who "talk ſo readily, and upon all occaſions, "that *we muſt make peace*, do not conſider

" that however well diſpoſed a ſovereign
" may be for the re-eſtabliſhment of tran-
" quillity, his deſire cannot be effectual,
" but when it is equally ſincere on the part
" of the other belligerent powers."

To find ſuch a ſentiment held forth by a French courtier and ſtateſman (for the Duke de Choiſeul ſubſcribes the memorial) at a moment when France was reduced to the very brink of deſtruction; and to hear, on the other hand, the mean and puſilanimous manner in which the citizens of this free country are too apt at preſent to expreſs themſelves, I confeſs, fills me with equal grief and aſtoniſhment. That peace is at this time a deſirable object, to a country that has been ſo long engaged in a war, unattended with many proſperous events, no man is more willing to allow: but that we are as yet reduced to a ſtate that ought to make us wiſh for peace on any terms; however degrading and humiliating, is a tenet which every man, who ſincerely wiſhes the glory and proſperity of his country, ought ſtrenuouſly to oppoſe. The moſt valuable acquiſitions may be too dearly purchaſed; and it is pro-

bable

bable that thoſe who ſo loudly exclaim for peace, are ignorant of the terms which are demanded by the enemy, and the ſtate to which they are reduced, and alſo unacquainted with the plans which it is in our power to purſue, together with the reſources ſtill in our poſſeſſion.

The terms demanded by the enemy, I have no acceſs to be better acquainted with, than any other private individual; but it is generally underſtood, that, in addition to American independence; in addition to the renunciation of Grenada, of Minorca, and of our former ſettlements in the Gulph of Honduras; in addition to the evacuation of New York and of Charleſtown; in addition to the reſtoration of Pondicherry, of St. Lucia, and of every other French and Dutch ſettlement we have acquired; and in addition to the ſurrender of Gibraltar, and, for ought that I know, of Jamaica, that other terms, equally diſgraceful and ruinous, either have been, or are to be demanded. The Britiſh flag muſt no longer be reverenced in the Britiſh ſeas; nor will our enemies be ſatisfied, unleſs the act of navi-

gation itſelf is annihilated, the boaſted ſource of our former ſplendor and proſperity *. He who is willing to accept of peace on ſuch terms as theſe, muſt not for a moment have conſidered to what a wretched ſtate ſuch a treaty would reduce us.

Allow me alſo to enquire of thoſe who are anxious for peace on any terms, what is the ſituation of thoſe powers at whoſe feet we are to crouch? The ſtate of France is

* See the addreſs of thanks to the great council of Leyden, in the collection of ſtate papers relating to the firſt acknowledgement of the ſovereignty of the united ſtates of America, by the States-General of the United Netherlands, of which the following is an extract. "The difficulties that "oppoſe themſelves to a partial pacification between Great "Britain and Holland, are too multiplied to be ſuddenly "removed. Such as the reſtoration of the poſſeſſions taken "from the States, &c. &c. &c. The annihilation, if poſ-"ſible, of the act of navigation, an act which carries too "evident marks of the ſupremacy affected by England over "all other maritime people, *not to attract attention at the "approaching negotiation of peace*; finally, the *neceſſity* of "breaking the yoke that Great Britain would impoſe on "our flag, to make her's reſpected in the Northern Ocean, "as the ſeat of her maritime empire, and other objects of "this nature, which, as the petulant proceedings of the "court of London have given riſe to them, will certainly "furniſh matter for claims and negotiations."

well

well known. With a fleet which nothing but a peace can re-eſtabliſh, and which, if re-eſtabliſhed, muſt render any peace ſhort-lived and precarious, and with her finances in ſuch diſorder, that her creditors are every moment dreading that their property will be attacked. Will Spain be long able to continue the war, baffled and diſpirited as ſhe is by the failure of her attempts on Gibraltar, and compelled, for want of ſpecie, to borrow half a million of money from the Dutch, and to tranſport it by land to Spain at a conſiderable riſk and expence *. The diſtracted ſtate of Holland, and her incapacity to carry on the war, every packet from the continent evinces; and before this time it is more than probable that the congreſs of America may regret the haughty manner in which they have rejected the pacific overtures of this country.

The ſituation alſo of Europe in general, with reſpect to grain, muſt ſoon diminiſh the inſolence of our enemies, and render

* The paper iſſued by the Spaniſh government is already at a diſcount of 14 per cent. and is likely ſoon to become like the paper dollars of America.

them

them truly desirous of obtaining peace, upon terms which we need not be ashamed to accept of. The price of grain in France, (which, it is well known, is the principal food of the inhabitants of that country) is already double to what it was last year, and will still be dearer *. Whereas, fortunately, it is only in respect of barley and oats, and not of wheat, that the crop of England is deficient. But wherever the deficiency may be, whether in this country, in France, in Spain, or in Holland, it is well known that the greatest part of the supply must be procured from the Baltic; and the following state of the commerce of that sea, for three years preceding 1782, will, it is hoped, clearly prove, that we have no reason to dread a scarcity on our part, (if it can be procured by trade with the Baltic) whatever may be the situation and fortune of our enemies.

* Flour at Bourdeaux is at present 29 livres per Cwt. the current price last year was only 14 livres; and the price at present in London is 18 shillings, or about 21 livres. The difference in our favour, considering every circumstance, is very great.

List

List of Ships that passed the Sound to and from the Baltic, for three Years preceding 1782.

Nation.	Ships in 1779.		Ditto in 1780.		Ditto in 1781.
Britiſh	1651	—	1701	—	2001
Bremeners	125	—	146	—	228
Dantzickers	196	—	174	—	220
Danes	1353	—	1341	—	1610
Spaniards	8	—	—	—	—
Flemiſh	16	—	30	—	92
Geoneſe	2	—	—	—	—
Hamburghers	31	—	31	—	54
Dutch	2075	—	2058	—	9
Lubeckers	74	—	82	—	84
Pruſſians	529	—	671	—	1584
Portugueſe	20	—	21	—	40
Roſtockers	64	—	104	—	86
Ruſſians	62	—	50	—	117
Swedes	1987	—	1880	—	2176
Courlanders	—	—	—	—	10
Venetians	—	—	2	—	1
	8193		8291		8312

It is hoped that this account, the authenticity of which may be depended upon, will

will be ſome comfort to thoſe who are perpetually dreading that our commerce is totally annihilated: and it is a ſingular circumſtance to ſee our trade increaſing from 1651 to 2001 ſhips, notwithſtanding the war we are engaged in, whilſt in the ſame ſpace of time, the Dutch are reduced from 2075 to only 9 ſail.

As to the plan that ought to be adopted, it may not be improper, ſhortly, to ſtate the different objects which it is in our power to purſue.

The war in America has proved ſo unſucceſsful, and every attempt to atchieve the conqueſt of that country has been attended with ſuch calamitous circumſtances, that no miniſter will probably be found bold enough to propoſe the renewal of ſo inauſpicious an attempt: but as ſome poſts on the continent may poſſibly be ſtill retained, and as the whole future fortune of the war will depend upon the choice that is made of a poſt on that continent, it is neceſſary in a peculiar manner to inveſtigate what place ought to be pitched upon: more eſpecially as New

York ſeems at preſent to be the favourite ſpot, a place in many reſpects ſo ill calculated for the purpoſe.

Indeed our having made New York the firſt object of our attack, has proved a principal ſource of our misfortunes in America. That continent was only vulnerable in its extremities. Whilſt we attacked the colonies in the *centre* of their empire, it was in their power, with much greater eaſe than otherwiſe could have been done, to aſſemble men from every corner of the continent to ſupply them with proviſions, and to furniſh them with every neceſſary article of war. Whereas if Charleſtown had been our firſt object in America, we muſt very ſpeedily have obtained the poſſeſſion of the province of which that city is the capital, and might have gradually gone on leaving no enemy behind us until we had either regained the poſſeſſion of the whole continent, or at leaſt ſecured to ourſelves the ſouthern colonies, which are by far the moſt valuable.

If New York or Charleſtown alſo muſt be evacuated, there is reaſon to imagine

 that

that Charleſtown is the fitteſt place for being our ſtrong-hold in America. One half of the troops now at New York, if added to the preſent garriſon at Charleſtown, would be put in poſſeſſion of the whole province of South Carolina, and inſure to us ſome of the moſt lucrative branches of the American trade *. Charleſtown alſo is a place which may be rendered impregnable; whereas New York muſt always be vulnerable to the attacks of a ſkilful and of an active enemy. If it is neceſſary therefore for the character of the nation, which I conſider it to be, that an aſylum ſhould be kept up at *any*

* The well-informed author of the Political Eſſays, printed into quarto anno 1772, has given us the following ſtate of the export ſtaples from our different colonies anno 1764, which fully proves the amazing value of the two Carolinas.

The amount of the Weſt-India exports		£. 2,702,060
Thoſe of the two Carolinas, &c.	—	722,700
Thoſe of the tobacco colonies	—	357,228
Thoſe of the northern ſettlements	—	98,562
		£. 3,880,550

It ought alſo to be obſerved that Charleſtown is particularly well calculated for the exportation of grain, rice, pitch, tar, and other articles which we require.

reaſonable

reaſonable expence, for the unfortunate loyaliſts of America, until the preſent troubles are ſettled, Charleſtown undoubtedly is the ſpot which ought to be pitched upon.

The only advantage which New York enjoys over Charleſtown is, that it anſwers better as a port to ſhelter our men of war, particularly our Weſt India ſquadrons in the hurricane ſeaſon, and enables us (as it is ſaid) more effectually to diſtreſs the commerce of the colonies.

With regard to ſhelter for our ſhips of war, the port of Halifax is much better calculated than either for that important purpoſe. In the words of Abbe Raynal, that port may be called *the natural rendezvous* of both the land and ſea forces which Great Britain may think herſelf obliged to maintain in America, either for the defence of her ſugar iſlands or the protection of her fiſheries. Halifax has none of thoſe natural obſtructions to which the harbour of New York is ſubjected *, and has alſo advantages,

* There is no bar at Halifax, nor is it ever incommoded with ice, which is far from being the caſe with New York.

vantages, in regard to maſts and timber, which render it in every reſpect a fitter place for being a maritime arſenal. As to diſtreſſing the trade of the colonies, two or three additional cruizers would do that more effectually, than can ever be expected from the poſſeſſion of New York: at any rate, ſo many millions per annum would be very idly expended, if it only anſwered the purpoſe of providing a port for our cruizers, and a lurking place for our privateers.

If inſtead of Charleſtown, therefore, New York were fortunately and expeditiouſly evacuated, we ſhould ſoon make a very different figure from what has lately been the caſe. If the garriſon of New York, Long Iſland, &c. including the armed and diſciplined refugees, amounting to 20,000 men; and if with five of theſe, and with the 7000 men now in Charleſtown, or, in other words, with a body of 12000 ſoldiers, we could retain the poſſeſſion of Charleſtown, and acquire the dominion of the province of South

Beſides Halifax, an excellent harbour might be found at Port Royal in South Carolina.

Carolina,

Carolina, it is evident that there would remain 15000 men to be employed in defending our West-India islands, or in attacking the settlements of our enemies: a force which, if properly made use of, would soon turn the tide of our affairs.

If in consequence also of the unreasonable demands of our enemies, we are obliged to persevere for some time longer in the present war, were the plan above stated pursued, the war would not be so ruinously expensive as it is at present. Our troops might be maintained by the grain and rice of Carolina, nor would it be necessary to transport provisions from this country for their subsistence. Our armies would not require to be attended by such a number of vessels as they at present demand; a service which employs many thousands of the prime of our seamen. Our navy would not be eternally occupied in conveying provisions to our armies, instead of being employed, as they ought to be, in humbling the naval armaments of our enemies: and lastly our troops, instead of being cooped up in some little insignificant spots, from whence

no

no real advantage can be obtained, if ſent to attack the poſſeſſions of our enemies, would ſoon acquire glory to themſelves, and territories to their country.

As to a defenſive war in America, retaining the poſſeſſion of New York, garriſoned by an expenſive army of 20,000 men, there cannot be, in every reſpect, a more contemptible idea. It would be better to aſſemble every ſoldier we have in America, from Quebec, Charleſtown, &c. to one ſpot, to ſearch for the army of the United States, wherever they were poſted, and to attack them even in their entrenchments, with the ancient ſpirit of Britiſh ſoldiers, firmly reſolving either to be maſters of the whole continent, or totally to abandon it. A defenſive war, if it ſhould coſt nothing, diſgraces the nation by whom it is carried on: but a defenſive war, that would be more expenſive than the moſt active campaign recorded in the hiſtory of this country, no wiſe man can poſſibly approve of. It would ſoon be put an end to, by the ſpirit and oppoſition of parliament, or by the indignation of the people.

Some,

Some, however, are of opinion that the continent of North America, at leaſt the Thirteen United Provinces, ought to be totally abandoned: and though I have ventured to ſuggeſt the plan which might be purſued, were the contrary ſyſtem to take place, yet I confeſs that the total dereliction of that continent does not appear to me an impolitic idea; at leaſt if the report is well founded, that no compenſation will be given for evacuating New York, or Charleſtown (becauſe the independance of the whole thirteen provinces is the baſis of the confederacy, and they have no poſſeſſion belonging to us which they can give us in return). Whereas if we can conquer any of the colonies of France or Spain, we are ſurely entitled to retain them, or, when peace is concluded, to obtain an adequate compenſation.

If the other branches of the confederacy, therefore, were to be attacked, one or other of the following plans might be adopted. We might either attack the Weſt India colonies of France, none of which would be able to reſiſt the efforts of a ſpirited attack; and,

and, heavy as the charges of the war have been, there is every reaſon to believe that we could conquer poſſeſſions from that nation, whoſe value would nearly repay the expences we have been put to *: or, if France is thought to be an enemy whoſe colonies cannot eaſily be maſtered, we are likely to find the continental poſſeſſions of Spain a very eaſy acquiſition. There is little reaſon to expect much reſiſtance from the natives (if in many provinces they would not fly to our aid); and it is not probable the hardened veterans who are now in America, would periſh in the manner which thoſe raw troops have in general done, who have been ſent on ſuch expeditions. The poſſeſſion of almoſt any province in that part of the world, would enable us to acquire the greateſt part of the trade of Spaniſh America, and would amply compenſate for the treaſure we have loſt.

* The value of the French Weſt India iſlands will ſufficiently appear, from the following ſtate of the ſhips that were ſent to them from France, anno 1776; namely, to St. Domingo, 353; to Guardeloupe, 88; to Martinique and St. Lucia, 141; total, 582; beſides 58 veſſels ſent to the coaſt of Africa with ſlaves.

But there is one plan, which, though we were reduced to a ſtate ever ſo deſperate, it will always be in our power to purſue; and that is, to ſupport, in conjunction with the other powers in Europe, and in particular with the armed neutrality, a ſyſtem of *a general colonial emancipation.* If the colonies of France, and more eſpecially if thoſe of Spain, were open to our manufactures, we ſhould have the greateſt reaſon to rejoice at the independance of America. Indeed a general colonial emancipation would be a fortunate concluſion of the preſent war, both for this country, and for mankind: thoſe rich and fertile provinces, which South America contains, have too long groaned under the dominion of the proud and ſluggiſh Spaniard, and might ſoon wear a new face, were they opened to the exertions and induſtry of this country, and of Europe. To queſtion whether the different powers of the European continent would ſupport ſuch a ſyſtem, is to doubt of their being poſſeſſed of common ambition, or indeed of common ſenſe: for were the Houſe of Bourbon to retain its colonies entire, whilſt Great Britain loſt hers, every one muſt perceive, that

the ſafety and independance of Europe in general would be greatly endangered.

But it is full time to give up ſuch general topics, and to advert to the original object of this publication, which is, to point out means which may be purſued, at this time, for the increaſe of our fleets; and how we may ſpeedily and efficaciouſly make uſe of the great reſources we are in poſſeſſion of, for the acquiſition of naval power. In particular, it is propoſed to refute two common objections: that it is difficult to procure men to man the ſhips we have; and ſtill more difficult to build more ſhips, were they neceſſary for the public ſervice. The firſt will require a ſhort inveſtigation into the nature and conſtitution of the naval department.

I. Procuring Seamen.

THE buſineſs of the board of admiralty may be divided into five ſeparate branches.

The firſt branch relates to the building and equipping of his Majeſty's ſhips: the ſecond,

ſecond, to the procuring ſeamen: the third, to the providing a ſufficient ſupply of wholeſome proviſions: the fourth, to the arrangement and promotion both of the ſuperior and inferior officers: and the laſt, to the proper deſtination of the fleet, when prepared for ſervice, and the obtaining authentic intelligence of the naval plans and operations of the enemy.

On account of the great variety and multiplicity of the buſineſs above ſtated, it has been found neceſſary to eſtabliſh two ſubordinate boards for the firſt and third branches (known by the names of the Navy and Victualling boards) and perhaps it is the greateſt defect in the preſent mode of conducting the naval buſineſs of this country, that there is not a ſubordinate board alſo for the ſecond branch, namely, that of procuring ſeamen, which is not the leaſt important or difficult of the whole. Were ſubordinate boards eſtabliſhed for the three firſt branches, it is evident that the controuling board of admiralty itſelf might conduct the two remaining ones, without having more buſi-

neſs upon its hands than it is poſſible for it to execute.

The want of ſuch a ſubordinate board having rendered the manning of his Majeſty's ſhips a very difficult operation, it has given riſe to an innumerable variety of plans for procuring ſeamen. In the reign of King William, a regiſter for a certain number of ſeamen was actually eſtabliſhed by act of parliament; though, after ſome trial, it was given up. Some very curious and important reſolutions of the ſame tendency alſo were entered into by the houſe of commons, in the year 1740; and a Bill, on ideas of a very ſimilar nature, has been lately brought into the houſe by a very reſpectable member (Sir Herbert Mackworth) and may poſſibly come under the diſcuſſion of the houſe in the courſe of this ſeſſion.

Though the worthy Baronet, who has moved for this Bill, has brought it to the greateſt degree of perfection of which it is capable, and is entitled to the higheſt praiſe for the zeal and public ſpirit which he has

ſhewn

ſhewn upon that, and upon many other occaſions, yet there is too much reaſon to imagine, that it is founded upon principles which it is ſcarcely poſſible to carry into execution.

For, in the firſt place, though the Bill in queſtion ſets out with the laudable intention of procuring the voluntary ſervice of ſeamen, yet whoever knows any thing of the character of Engliſh ſailors, muſt be ſenſible that it is impoſſible that any great proportion of them can be inclined to expoſe themſelves to the dangers, and to the ſevere diſcipline of his Majeſty's ſervice, whilſt they can get larger pay and more liberty, with leſs hazard, in the ſervice of a merchant. Unleſs the nature of our ſeamen, therefore, were to be totally altered, or unleſs the merchant ſervice were to become leſs eligible, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that 100,000 ſeamen, the number now voted by parliament, could be procured, without the aſſiſtance of compulſion.

In the ſecond place, though the Bill, by a tax upon all the ſhipping in the kingdom, according

according to their tonnage, and by other means, propoſes to raiſe a fund ſufficient to defray the expences of the propoſed inſtitution; and though, in this manner, no part of the public revenue, as it now ſtands, will be abſorbed; yet in fact it ought to be conſidered, that it does the ſame thing, by taking to itſelf a ſource of taxation, which might be appropriated for other purpoſes; and for which, as well as for many more, the public has ample occaſion.

In the third place, it is apprehended, that the various remote pecuniary advantages, in caſe of wounds or accidents, which are held forth in the Bill with a view of inciting ſailors to enter into the fellowſhip, and voluntarily to go on board of his Majeſty's ſhips, would be a great expence to the public, without any adequate advantage. Experience ſufficiently proves, that men are in general attentive only to preſent advantages; and of all men, that ſeamen are the moſt heedleſs with reſpect to diſtant emolument. When the young ſailor and ſoldier reſolve to enter into the ſervice of the public, it is not wounds and danger, it is not broken limbs,

limbs, or the trifling advantage of being a Greenwich or Chelſea penſioner, which they have in view, but glory, plunder, and preferment: and it is firmly believed, that all the advantages which are propoſed in the Bill, would not add as many ſailors to his Majeſty's fleet, as would man the ſmalleſt veſſel in the ſervice. It is not propoſed by this to inſinuate, that old or diſabled ſailors and ſoldiers are not entitled, in a certain degree, to the bounty of the public: juſtice and humanity plead equally in their behalf: but it is intended to refute, or at leaſt to deny, the fundamental principle of this Bill, which is, that diſtant or future emoluments can ever be of any conſiderable advantage, in procuring a ſufficient number of able ſeamen to enter voluntarily into the ſervice.

But were there a better proſpect than there is of the plan in queſtion ſucceeding, and were it liable to fewer weighty objections, yet it would ſurely be very dangerous, at ſuch a time as this, to think of making ſuch an experiment: in particular, as it might give our ſeamen ſome reaſon to imagine,

gine, that they are entitled to more advantages than they at preſent poſſeſs; and might inſtil into their minds a new idea, that it was hard, however preſſing the neceſſities of the ſtate might be, to compel them to ſerve in the navy. And as, in fact, the plan is nothing elſe (however much it may be diſguiſed by ſuch terms as Voluntary Regiſter, or Fellowſhip of Seamen, &c.) but the eſtabliſhment of a board, ſubordinate to the board of admiralty, for the purpoſe of manning the navy, the following plan, founded upon ſafer and ſounder principles, with the ſame deſirable object in view, is with great deference ſuggeſted.

In the firſt place, it is propoſed, that the ſecond branch of the board of admiralty, namely, that of procuring ſeamen, ſhould be put under the management of a third ſubordinate board, to be called THE MARINE BOARD, to conſiſt of five commiſſioners, a ſecretary, clerks, &c. who ſhall conduct that branch of the naval buſineſs of this country, under the controul and direction of the admiralty.

In

In the ſecond place, it is propoſed, that inſtead of thoſe regulating captains and preſs-gangs, which are at preſent ſpread along the coaſts of the iſland (who, when idle, are a uſeleſs and heavy expence to the ſtate; or, when they do procure men for the ſervice, deter other ſailors from voluntarily entering, by the violent and outrageous manner in which they conduct themſelves) that ſubordinate officers to the ſaid marine board ſhall be eſtabliſhed in all the different diſtricts of the kingdom, ſo that every part of the iſland may be under the inſpection of ſome one or other of theſe officers.

In the third place, it is propoſed, that the ſaid board, and its ſubordinate officers, ſhall be obliged to furniſh the admiralty, from time to time, with an exact and authentic account of the number of ſeafaring people in all the different diſtricts of the kingdom; who, for that purpoſe, ſhall be compelled, under certain penalties, to give in their names, and places of abode, to the marine officer appointed to receive them: ſhall tranſmit alſo, with as much expedition as poſſible, to their proper place of rendezvous,

the fair proportion of ſeamen which each diſtrict is ordered to ſupply: and laſtly, ſhall give every poſſible aſſiſtance to the ſeamen belonging to their diſtrict, for procuring their pay, their effects, or their ſhare of prize-money to themſelves, their family, or relations.

It would alſo in a particular manner be the duty of this board, and of its ſubordinate officers, to point out what ſteps ought to be taken, in order to increaſe the number of ſailors in their reſpective diſtricts: and more eſpecially, how nurſeries of ſeamen might be brought up all along the extended coaſts of this iſland. It ought to be a rule with them, as it is a law in France, never to cut down or ſend off an old tree, without planting a young one in its ſtead. It was by means of placing apprentices and ſupernumerary men on board of merchantmen, that Lewis the XIV. was able to rear the navy that he did: and if, during the progreſs of this war, care had been taken to put a number of apprentices on board of merchantmen, to ſupply the deficiency of ſailors in that ſervice, occaſioned by the numbers

taken

taken into the pay of the public, what a gallant troop of young and able ſeamen would by this time have been ready for the ſtate! We ſhould not, in that caſe, have had our ports filled with foreign ſeamen, but the commerce of England would have been almoſt totally carried on by the natives of this country. From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that no leſs a number than 20,000 foreign ſeamen entered the ports of Great Britain only, excluſive of Ireland, from the 1ſt of January 1781, to the 1ſt of January 1782.

It would alſo be proper that this board, and its ſubordinate officers, ſhould be obliged to furniſh the admiralty, from time to time, with an exact account of the number of SHIPWRIGHTS in the kingdom, leaſt a greater number was required for the King's yards, than could be procured without compulſion. For it muſt be obſerved, that ſhipwrights were formerly preſſed, as well as ſeamen, into the public ſervice, and are fully as neceſſary.

The manner in which the men are intended to be raiſed in each diſtrict, will appear ſufficiently evident from the following ſketch.

In the firſt place, each ſubordinate officer muſt endeavour to raiſe the number of men wanted in each diſtrict, by beating up for volunteers; and by offering the higheſt bounty, which it is ſuppoſed the public can afford. If that is not ſufficient, and the number cannot be procured, they ought, in the ſecond place, to be directed to lay an embargo upon all veſſels, of every ſize and denomination, including even fiſhing boats, until the proportion of ſeamen is furniſhed. And thirdly, if the number is not yet made up, they ſhall next proceed, in the preſence of two or more juſtices of the peace in the neighbourhood, to caſt lots, which of the ſeamen in the diſtrict ſhall be compelled to ſerve: and, in caſe of their refuſal, ſhall be empowered, not by means of preſs-gangs, which is a barbarous mode of compulſion, and gives our ſeamen a diſtaſte of the ſervice, but by means of the civil, and, if neceſſary, the military power of the

the ſtate, to compel ſuch as refuſe voluntarily to go: and ſhall publiſh rewards for apprehending ſuch as attempt to ſecrete themſelves. Each of theſe ſeamen thus compelled by lot, ſhall not be obliged to ſerve for above three years (peculiar exigencies excepted), unleſs, in conſequence of a larger bounty, they become bound to continue in the ſervice for a longer ſpace of time.

One obſervation muſt be added reſpecting this part of the ſubject, namely, that the moſt admirable effects may be expected to reſult from partial embargoes. When every diſtrict knew, that procuring a number of ſea-faring people for the public ſervice, would inſure it protection for the remainder, and full liberty of employing their ſeamen, fiſhermen, &c. in any manner they choſe, the greateſt exertions might be expected. Every deſcription of men; the merchant for the ſake of his trade; the rich for the ſake of procuring delicacies for their tables, and the poor for the ſake of employment (which would be diminiſhed by the embargo upon trade) would be intereſted in procuring the neceſſary ſupply as

ſpeedily

ſpeedily as poſſible: and the ſailor himſelf, to make uſe of an odd expreſſion, would be voluntarily compelled for the ſake of perſonal maintainance to enter into the ſervice. If an embargo indeed was laid upon veſſels of every ſize and denomination, it is improbable that it would ever be neceſſary to reſort to any kind of compulſion: at leaſt the Dutch, who allow no preſſing, have always found an embargo a ſure mode of manning their navy, whatever might be the number of ſhips which it was neceſſary to fit out.

Laſtly, it is farther propoſed that ſome ſubordinate officers ſhould be eſtabliſhed even in the inland parts of the country, where, in time of war, many of our ſailors fly for ſhelter, whom, as well as the watermen, bargemen, &c. who uſually reſide there, it would be proper to look after. By means of ſuch officers, alſo apprentices for the ſea ſervice might be procured from the moſt inland counties, which are at preſent of little ſervice for rearing ſeamen.

As to the uſe of ſuch an eſtabliſhment, the expence of it would be amply repaid by furniſh-

furniſhing the Admiralty with authentic information reſpecting the exact number of ſea-faring people in the kingdom: and the proportion which each diſtrict is able to afford: and notwithſtanding the loud complaints which we have heard of the ſcarcity of ſailors, there is reaſon to believe that there are at leaſt 100,000 ſea-faring people including fiſhermen, bargemen, *&c.* not at preſent in his Majeſty's ſervice: from thence it muſt appear that it is not owing to the want of ſeamen, but to the want of proper management, that there is any deficiency in manning our ſhips. We have the materials, but we have not provided the workmen, or the machines neceſſary for making ſuch valuable materials uſeful.

That there are at leaſt 100,000 ſea-faring people not at preſent in his Majeſty's ſervice, there is the greateſt reaſon to believe. From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that from the 1ſt Jan. 1781 to the 1ſt Jan. 1782, there were entered into the ports of England and Scotland no leſs a number than 4141 Britiſh ſhips, manned

manned by 31944 Britiſh ſailors, excluſively of the maſter: and if the trade of Ireland requires above 8000 ſailors, which is a very moderate calculation, there are at leaſt 40,000 real ſeamen in the ſervice of individuals. It is commonly calculated that there are 40,000 watermen, bargemen, &c. employed from Windſor to Graveſend, but we ſhall ſtate the men employed in all the different rivers and canals of Great Britain and Ireland at that number: and it will not probably be accounted too high a calculation to ſuppoſe that 20,000 fiſhermen are employed in boats along the extended coaſts of this iſland, or have ſecreted themſelves in the country, and given up their former mode of living, from the terror of being preſſed.

Indeed it would be no inconſiderable advantage attending the eſtabliſhment which is propoſed, that it would put an end to the preſent enormous expence of the impreſs ſervice, of which the following is an accurate account, from the 1ſt October 1780 to the 1ſt October 1781.

For

	£.	s.	d.
For the impreſs ſervice on ſhore in Great Britain.	124,229	15	0
Ditto in Ireland —	19,936	10	1
Ditto in tenders at ſea	78,879	13	3
	£. 214,045	18	4

Such was the expence of procuring only 7081 ſeamen, one half of whom would take the earlieſt opportunity of deſerting. Whereas the ſame account ſtates, that in the ſame ſpace of time 8844 ſeamen and landmen entered voluntarily, whoſe bounty only amounted to *l.* 29,433 10*s.*

A variety of more minute obſervations might be made; but theſe are ſufficient to explain the general tendency of a plan which could not be attended with much expence to the ſtate; and which, if it anſwered the intention, muſt prove of the greateſt national utility. It would at leaſt prevent the odious cuſtom of preſſing almoſt every perſon indiſcriminately, which has ſo long been the opprobrium of this country. It would furniſh as many ſailors now employed in preſſing, as would man, with the aſ-

 ſiſtance

ſiſtance of marines and of landmen, no leſs a number than five ſail of the line, from 2 to 3000 men being generally employed in that ſervice, and theſe amongſt the ableſt of our ſeamen.

The following account, which was laid before Parliament, will inform the reader how many ſeamen were employed in the impreſs ſervice, from the 1ſt October 1780 to the 1ſt October 1781.

	Captains.	Lieut.	Maſters.	Petty Offic.	Men.	Total.
Officers and men employed on ſhore in Great Britain.	27	100	—	205	1162	1494
Ditto in Ireland.	3	5	—	10	78	96
Ditto at ſea in tenders.	—	44	57	185	968	1254
	30	149	57	400	2208	2844

But it may be ſaid that the plan does not exclude all ideas of compulſion; for that ſailors may ſtill be preſſed, though undoubtedly in a leſs odious manner by the civil power, or even by the military who are kept under ſome kind of regular diſcipline, than by the uſual mode of preſs-gangs, who when on land think themſelves totally

totally exempted from every ſpecies of controul: to which ſome will probably add, that every kind of compulſion is impolitic in itſelf, and contrary to the principles of that free conſtitution which we ſo much glory to enjoy.

That the citizens of every free ſtate, and of England in particular, are entitled to the enjoyment of as much liberty as is conſiſtent with the exiſtence of government, no man is more ready to allow or more anxious to ſupport: but ſuch extenſive liberty it is evident is only ſuited to times of peace and tranquillity; and when war rages, muſt be neceſſarily diminiſhed. In fact, in time of war, the free citizen can hardly enjoy much more perſonal liberty than the ſubjects of that power with whom his country is at variance: and if that power can compel all its ſubjects to take arms, or all its ſailors to enter on board its ſhips of war, the citizens of the free ſtate muſt be ſubjected to the ſame hardſhip; otherwiſe they muſt run the riſque of being conquered by their enemies, and of loſing for ever, both in peace

and in war, every franchiſe and liberty which they poſſeſs.

In the ſecond place it may be urged, that on every principle of political ſociety, there is no hardſhip in compelling any one to ſerve the ſtate in the manner in which he can prove of the greateſt public utility, provided he is maintained at the public expence in the manner to which his ſtation entitles him: and the reaſon that real ſailors are alone ſubject, to what is commonly called that ſpecies of oppreſſion, is, that none but real ſailors can ſo well anſwer the purpoſes of the ſtate at ſea. Were it otherwiſe, it would be ſurely reaſonable that every landman in the kingdom ſhould be liable to the ſame ſyſtem of compulſion. The bad policy of the preſent plan of preſſing is, that no man knows when he is to go; that he may be dragged from the ſhip he belongs to, and may loſe the pay he earned, and the little effects belonging to him, without any legal authority: nay that he is liable every moment to be torn from his own home, may be obliged to leave his family,

family, without knowing how they are to be ſupported, and may find himſelf treated rather as a felon than as a ſubject and a free one too ought to be uſed, and all without the poſſibility of redreſs: whereas if no ſailor or ſea-faring perſons were compelled to ſerve but by the civil authority of the ſtate, if he had ſufficient warning given him and an opportunity afforded of ſettling his own little affairs before he entered into the ſervice; if he received his wages regularly, and enjoyed the full advantage of ſending any part of them to his family or his friends; if he was certain to receive when on board good and wholeſome proviſions; if his ſervice were not to exceed a certain limited time; were his officers under an obligation of treating him well, and were all prize-money to be more equally diſtributed, no Engliſh ſailor would have any juſt reaſon to regret having contributed his aſſiſtance to ſave his country and to humble her enemies.

But if, notwithſtanding every attempt of this nature, it is ſtill found difficult to procure a ſufficient number of ſeamen, we muſt in that caſe imitate the example originally ſet

ſet as in the reign of King William, by which five thouſand men, included in the eſtimate of guards and garriſons, were employed on board the fleet. Nay, on the 3d of February, 1701, the Houſe addreſſed his majeſty to interpoſe with his allies, that they ſhould increaſe their quotas *of land forces to be put on board the fleet*, in proportion to the numbers his majeſty ſhall have on board his fleet. If the ſame ſyſtem is carried to a proportionable extent at this time, joined to the conſiderable aſſiſtance that Ireland has given us, we can hardly want a ſufficient number of men for the manning of our navy.

We ſhall next enquire how far procuring ſhips can be accounted an inſurmountable obſtacle.

II. Building Ships.

THE plan that was propoſed of building ſhips by voluntary ſubſcription having failed, it is undoubtedly a deſirable circumſtance to have ſome other mode pointed out of encreaſing the number of our ſhips; more eſpecially

eſpecially as an ardent deſire is now prevalent in the whole nation to make our navy truly reſpectable; for it was not from want of inclination that the different counties in England, who aſſembled for that purpoſe, did not vote a ſhip of war adequate to the property they contained, but becauſe no plan was ſuggeſted that appeared entitled to general approbation.

The plan of voluntary contributions is certainly in this reſpect defenſible, that it furniſhes public-ſpirited individuals, and alſo great and wealthy corporate bodies, with an opportunity of diſplaying their zeal for the intereſt of their country; and they tend ſo much to prove the reſources and the ſtrength of a nation, as frequently to damp the courage and ſpirit of its foes. Indeed had a general aid of that nature been given by the public, when ſo glorious an example was ſhewn by the Eaſt-India Company, (after our late ſucceſſes at ſea, with the addition which that would have afforded) it would have been in our power at this time to have dictated the terms of peace.

As

As to the objection, that voluntary aids to the Crown are contrary to the principles of this conſtitution, however reſpectable they may be who maintain ſuch an opinion, I find little difficulty in giving a very different judgment upon the queſtion. God forbid that Britiſh ſubjects ſhould not be at full liberty to do what they pleaſe with their own property, provided they make uſe of it in a manner unprohibited by any known law! By voluntary contributions many nations have been ſaved from the moſt imminent danger of deſtruction. But it will be difficult to produce a ſingle example of any kingdom that has been ruined by the free, uncompulſive, pecuniary contributions of its inhabitants.

But the ſolid objection to ſuch ſubſcriptions is, that they are unequal, and that, though ſome pay more than they would probably be taxed at, yet that there are many who, from various motives, perhaps from diſlike to thoſe by whom the plan is ſet on foot, or perhaps from diſinclination to part with their money, are not fond of encouraging ſuch a ſcheme: it becomes therefore

fore neceſſary, ſince voluntary ſubſcriptions have failed, to point out ſome other means, by which not only the navy may be ſpeedily increaſed at preſent, but which may prove an example, to have recourſe to in future periods of equal danger and diſtreſs.

The great difficulty is, how to raiſe a ſum of money proportionate to the real income of each individual. The cuſtoms, the exciſe, ſtamps, &c. are already appropriated. The inequality of the land-tax is a general ſubject of complaint; and it is a tax from which the opulent ſtockholder is exempted. The taxes on ſervants and carriages, are of too partial and confined a nature to anſwer the purpoſe. It remains therefore only to diſcover, whether a ſmall duty upon houſes, exempting all thoſe that are uninhabited or poſſeſſed by the poor, would not raiſe a ſum ſufficient for building 50 ſhips of war, without laying a duty upon any houſe which its poſſeſſor could not very eaſily afford. By raiſing the tax alſo not in one, but in the ſpace of three years, it will prove leſs burthenſome to thoſe (if there are any ſuch) who may find it inconvenient to pay their

proportion; and would give others an opportunity of ſhewing their public ſpirit, by paying in at once the whole duty at which they are rated.

It will appear, from the calculations in the Tables oppoſite, numbered I, II, III, how ſmall a duty upon houſes will raiſe a ſum ſufficient to build the addition that is propoſed.

But it may be ſaid, that procuring money is not the only circumſtance to be deſired; but that it is alſo neceſſary to have ſlips on which thoſe ſhips may be built, and ſhipwrights by whom they may be conſtructed.

When the clamour that has been raiſed with reſpect to a ſcarcity of ſlips is conſidered, it will, I am perſuaded, be difficult to believe that the expence of making one does not exceed the ſmall ſum of from 1500 to 2000 l. When we are told that the navy of England is at a ſtand, becauſe all the ſlips in the kingdom are occupied, one would be apt to imagine, that there is ſome natural impediment to the conſtruction of

No. I. ACCOUNT of the Number of Houſes in ENGLAND, Houſes, Windows, or Lights, according to actual Sur

Counties.	Under 7 Windows.	Having 7 Windows.	Having 8 Windows.	Having 9 Windows.	Having 10 Windows.	Having 11 Windows.	Having 12 Windows.	Having 13 Windows
Bedford	1727	1059	240	274	199	454	142	104
Berks	2144	1804	433	453	375	608	195	198
Bucks	2471	2046	384	513	365	624	230	196
Cambridge	3612	1754	603	459	310	472	220	105
Cheſter	8696	3704	490	677	406	882	123	132
Cornwall	7274	2771	584	905	400	443	190	128
Cumberland	9421	1740	245	252	121	147	56	30
Derby	7647	2553	320	426	248	530	118	90
Devon	11234	6046	1464	1534	1057	1471	620	430
Dorſet	4822	2098	483	522	384	629	222	174
Durham	7295	2061	314	362	287	332	103	68
York	40777	15012	2490	2617	1770	2527	774	555
Eſſex	4225	3283	1042	792	774	1445	671	498
Glouceſter	5022	3513	406	784	602	1265	310	288
Hereford	3619	1390	263	321	248	145	160	123
Hertford	2297	1721	367	439	327	638	232	182
Huntingdon	1585	730	210	170	132	239	88	65
Kent	10096	6386	1107	1450	1051	2077	660	561
Lancaſter	17567	9884	1356	1305	834	1072	342	367
Leiceſter	3910	2442	614	553	373	656	222	138
Lincoln	12377	5068	930	1001	599	885	322	248
London	403	641	354	579	529	840	577	700
Weſtminſter	563	355	192	454	347	577	553	592
Middleſex	4110	3858	1464	2279	1713	2825	1539	1520
Norfolk	5934	4009	1094	976	753	1250	556	436
Northampton	3092	2440	585	696	486	964	348	211
Northumberland	7869	11382	405	377	273	325	185	138
Nottingham	6239	1957	285	345	230	562	108	68
Oxford	2936	1942	390	485	350	868	196	144
Rutland	546	348	60	65	46	123	21	21
Salop	5711	2903	349	484	360	790	183	151
Somerſet	8137	5714	1199	1523	1073	1631	598	503
Southampton	3440	3352	629	873	584	1030	420	336
Stafford	7051	4001	510	734	414	911	192	144
Suffolk	6303	3717	1082	989	711	1319	595	450
Surrey	3959	1693	406	516	363	778	285	244
Suſſex	1973	2749	339	582	375	1131	229	226
Southwark	662	923	476	626	516	670	330	354
Warwick	3118	2665	533	847	598	1319	372	303
Weſtmoreland	3470	1193	116	153	78	140	17	29
Wilts	3718	2771	569	699	488	942	312	249
Worceſter	2124	1809	335	491	362	858	203	180
Monmouth	2717	939	62	173	68	106	38	22
Wales	34353	3524	449	625	346	524	206	155
Scotland	4813	4061	1674	1095	862	1119	600	315
	291109	136011	27902	32475	22787	39443	14663	12171

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GLAND, WALES, and SCOTLAND, charge

l Surveys laid before the House of Commons 23d January, 1781.

Having 13 Windows.	Having from 14 to 19 Windows.	Having 20 Windows.	Having 21 Windows.	Having 22 Windows.	Having 23 Windows.	Having 24 Windows.	Having 25 and upwards.	Total.
104	436	37	12	23	20	12	377	4966
198	873	80	57	56	44	54	528	7902
196	856	86	58	45	38	56	348	8316
185	703	53	43	33	21	23	313	8721
132	786	41	32	28	41	31	283	16352
128	693	63	44	41	20	34	263	15853
30	182	8	4	7	8	12	88	12321
90	525	19	22	20	28	22	240	12808
430	1834	119	99	85	80	84	624	26779
174	702	53	43	30	30	33	300	10525
68	459	32	23	27	21	20	240	11844
555	2870	203	174	147	127	120	1433	71596
498	2532	253	165	174	141	126	1116	17257
288	1657	108	63	62	51	71	655	24857
123	740	36	37	24	30	27	270	7733
182	1140	85	60	65	59	29	656	8397
65	282	22	18	15	12	9	114	3691
561	3238	232	157	169	116	154	1379	28833
367	1112	127	69	61	59	52	517	34724
138	726	49	17	29	25	15	273	10045
248	1217	135	102	58	56	50	465	23513
700	4524	403	376	354	330	368	3086	14064
592	5774	472	503	468	506	500	4121	25977
1526	9622	676	571	604	526	557	4864	36728
436	2400	199	161	143	119	118	1207	19355
211	1207	71	41	42	33	44	376	10616
138	705	64	38	37	29	32	303	12158
68	505	35	22	24	11	23	215	20087
144	966	62	44	40	49	35	426	8933
21	121	4	3	3	2	4	38	1485
151	882	57	37	25	31	32	348	22343
503	2469	196	185	157	113	116	1171	24785
336	1642	138	95	73	75	95	791	33563
144	1009	72	44	46	23	41	369	45264
450	2205	178	134	129	112	94	800	28028
244	1929	135	71	85	67	78	1208	21817
226	1529	80	62	52	61	72	539	9989
354	1490	112	70	60	38	55	489	6872
303	1577	111	60	60	51	53	439	12098
29	136	9	7	3	7	5	43	5406
249	1511	113	78	67	69	68	591	22227
180	1013	72	76	54	39	42	360	8088
22	130	10	5	3	4	3	41	4381
155	745	75	31	46	29	38	388	45980
315	1764	174	68	88	57	65	979	37788
12171	69416	5359	4068	3860	3409	3364	33574	698[illegible]

Counties.	6 Having Windows.	7 Having Windows.	8 Having Windows.	9 Having Windows.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cambridge	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Chester	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cornwall	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Devon	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Durham	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
York	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Essex	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Gloucester	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Hampshire	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Hereford	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Hertford	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Huntingdon	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Kent	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Lancaster	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Leicester	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Lincoln	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
London	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Monmouth	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Norfolk	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Northampton	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Northumberland	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Nottingham	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Oxford	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rutland	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Somerset	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Southampton	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Stafford	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Suffolk	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Surrey	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sussex	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Warwick	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Westmoreland	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Wilts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Worcester	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
York	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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No. II. STATE of the Sums that might be raiſed in ENGLAND, W
by laying the following additional Duties upon Houſes and
charged by reaſon of Poverty.

Counties.	Under 7 Windows, 3 Shillings each Houſe.	Having 7 Windows, 4s. each Houſe.	Having 8 Windows, 5s. each Houſe.	Having 9 Windows, 6s. each Houſe.	Having 10 Windows, 7s. each Houſe.	Having 11 Windows, 8s. each Houſe.	Having 12 Windows, 9s. each Houſe.	Having 13 Windows, 10s. each Houſe.	Having from 14 to Windo 1l. each H
	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£.
Bedford	266 11	211 16	60 —	82 4	69 13	181 12	63 18	52 —	436
Berks	321 12	360 16	108 5	135 18	131 5	243 4	87 15	99 —	873
Bucks	370 13	409 4	96 —	153 18	127 15	249 12	103 10	98 —	856
Cambridge	541 16	350 16	150 15	137 14	108 10	188 16	99 —	52 10	703
Cheſter	1304 8	740 16	122 10	203 2	142 2	352 16	55 7	66 —	786
Cornwall	1091 2	554 4	146 —	271 10	140 —	177 4	85 10	64 —	693
Cumberland	1413 3	348 —	61 5	75 12	42 7	58 16	25 4	15 —	182
Derby	1147 1	510 12	80 —	127 16	86 16	212 —	53 2	45 —	525
Devon	1685 2	1209 4	366 —	460 4	369 19	588 8	279 —	215 —	1834
Dorſet	723 6	419 12	120 15	156 12	134 8	251 12	99 18	87 —	702
Durham	1094 5	412 4	78 10	108 12	100 9	132 16	46 7	34 —	459
York	6116 11	3002 8	622 10	785 2	619 10	1010 16	349 16	277 10	2870
Eſſex	633 15	656 12	260 10	237 12	270 18	578 —	301 19	249 —	2532
Glouceſter	753 6	702 12	101 10	235 4	210 14	506 —	139 10	144 —	1657
Hereford	542 17	278 —	65 15	96 6	86 16	58 —	72 —	61 10	740
Hertford	344 11	344 4	91 15	131 14	114 —	255 4	104 8	91 —	1140
Huntingdon	237 15	146 —	52 10	51 —	46 4	95 12	39 12	32 10	282
Kent	1514 8	1277 4	276 15	435 —	367 17	830 16	297 —	280 10	3238
Lancaſter	2635 1	1976 16	339 —	391 10	291 18	428 16	153 18	183 10	1112
Leiceſter	586 10	488 8	153 10	165 18	130 11	262 8	99 18	69 —	726
Lincoln	1856 11	1013 12	232 10	300 6	209 13	354 —	144 18	124 —	1217
London	60 9	128 4	88 10	173 14	185 3	336 —	259 13	350 —	4524
Weſtminſter	84 9	71 —	48 —	136 4	121 9	230 16	248 17	296 —	5774
Middleſex	616 10	771 12	366 —	683 14	599 11	1130 —	692 11	760 —	9622
Norfolk	890 2	801 16	273 10	292 16	263 11	500 —	250 4	218 —	2400
Northampton	463 16	488 —	146 5	208 16	170 2	385 12	156 12	105 10	1207
Northumberland	1180 7	276 8	101 5	113 2	95 11	130 —	83 5	69 —	705
Nottingham	935 17	391 8	71 5	103 10	80 10	224 16	48 12	34 —	505
Oxford	440 8	388 8	97 10	145 10	122 10	347 4	88 4	72 —	966
Rutland	81 18	69 12	15 —	19 10	16 2	49 4	9 9	10 10	121
Salop	856 13	580 12	87 5	145 4	126 —	316 —	82 7	75 10	882
Somerſet	1220 11	1142 16	299 15	456 18	375 11	652 8	269 2	251 10	2469
Southampton	516 —	670 8	157 5	261 18	204 8	412 —	189 —	168 —	1642
Stafford	1057 13	800 4	127 10	220 4	144 18	364 8	86 8	72 —	1009
Suffolk	945 9	743 8	270 10	296 14	248 17	527 12	267 15	225 —	2205
Surrey	593 17	338 12	101 10	154 16	127 1	311 4	128 5	122 —	1929
Suſſex	295 19	549 16	84 15	174 12	131 5	452 8	103 1	113 —	1529
Southwark	99 6	184 12	119 —	187 16	180 12	268 —	148 10	177 —	1490
Warwick	467 14	533 —	133 5	254 2	209 6	527 12	167 8	151 10	1577
Weſtmoreland	520 10	238 12	29 —	45 18	27 6	56 —	7 13	14 10	136
Wilts	557 14	554 4	142 5	209 14	170 16	376 16	140 8	124 10	1511
Worceſter	318 12	361 16	83 15	147 6	126 14	343 4	91 7	90 —	1013
Monmouth	407 11	187 16	15 10	51 18	23 16	42 8	17 2	11 —	130
Wales	5152 19	704 16	112 5	187 10	121 2	209 12	92 14	77 10	745
Scotland	721 19	812 4	418 10	328 10	301 14	447 12	270 —	157 10	1764
	43666 7	27202 4	6975 10	9742 10	7975 9	15657 4	6599 17	6085 10	69418

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ND, WALES, and SCOTLAND, for the Purpose of increasing the Navy, and Windows, exempting such as are uninhabited, or have not been

	Having from 14 to 19 Windows, 1l. each House.	Having 20 Windows, 1l. 5s. each House.	Having 21 Windows, 1l. 10s. each House.	Having 22 Windows, 1l. 15s. each House.	Having 23 Windows, 2l. each House.	Having 24 Windows, 2l. 10s. each House.	Having 25 and upwards, 5l. each House.	Total Sum for 1 Year.	Total Sum for 3 Years.
s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.
—	436 —	46 5	18 —	40 5	40 —	30 —	885 —	2483 4	7449 12
—	873 —	100 —	85 10	98 —	88 —	135 —	2640 —	5507 5	16521 15
—	856 —	107 10	87 —	78 15	76 —	140 —	1740 —	4693 17	14081 11
10	703 —	66 5	63 —	57 15	42 —	57 10	1555 —	4174 7	12523 1
—	786 —	51 5	48 —	49 —	82 —	77 10	1415 —	5495 16	16487 8
—	693 —	78 15	66 —	71 15	40 —	85 —	1315 —	4879 —	14637 —
—	182 —	10 —	6 —	12 5	16 —	30 —	440 —	2735 12	8206 16
—	525 —	23 15	33 —	35 —	56 —	55 —	1200 —	4190 2	12570 6
—	1834 —	148 15	148 10	145 5	160 —	210 —	3120 —	10939 7	32818 1
—	702 —	66 5	64 10	52 10	60 —	82 10	1500 —	4520 18	13562 14
—	459 —	40 —	19 10	47 5	42 —	50 —	1250 —	3914 18	11774 14
10	2870 —	253 15	261 —	257 5	254 —	300 —	7165 —	24145 3	72435 9
—	2532 —	316 5	247 10	304 10	282 —	315 —	5580 —	12765 11	38296 13
—	1657 —	135 —	94 10	108 10	102 —	177 10	3275 —	8342 6	25026 18
10	740 —	45 —	55 10	42 —	60 —	67 10	1350 —	3621 4	10863 12
—	1140 —	106 5	90 —	113 15	118 —	72 10	3280 —	6397 15	19193 5
10	282 —	27 10	27 —	26 5	24 —	22 10	570 —	1680 8	5041 4
10	3238 —	290 —	235 10	295 15	232 —	385 —	6895 —	16850 15	50552 5
10	1112 —	158 15	103 10	106 15	118 —	130 —	2585 —	10714 9	32143 7
—	726 —	61 5	25 10	50 15	52 —	37 10	1375 —	4284 3	12852 9
—	1217 —	168 15	153 —	101 10	112 —	125 —	2325 —	8437 15	25312 5
—	4524 —	503 15	564 —	619 10	660 —	920 —	15430 —	24802 18	74408 14
—	5774 —	590 —	754 10	819 —	1012 —	1250 —	20605 —	32041 5	96123 15
—	9622 —	845 —	856 10	1057 —	1052 —	1392 10	24320 —	44764 18	134294 14
—	2400 —	248 15	241 10	250 5	238 —	295 —	6035 —	13198 9	39595 7
10	1207 —	88 15	61 10	73 10	66 —	110 —	1880 —	5611 8	16834 4
—	705 —	80 —	51 —	64 15	58 —	80 —	1515 —	4602 13	13807 19
—	505 —	43 15	33 —	42 —	22 —	57 —	1065 —	3657 13	10972 19
—	966 —	77 10	66 —	70 —	98 —	87 10	2130 —	5196 14	15590 2
10	121 —	5 —	4 10	5 5	4 —	10 —	190 —	611 —	1833 —
10	882 —	71 5	55 10	43 15	62 —	80 —	1740 —	5204 1	15612 3
10	2469 —	245 —	277 10	274 15	226 —	290 —	5855 —	14305 16	42917 8
—	1642 —	172 10	142 10	127 15	150 —	227 10	3955 —	8996 4	26988 12
—	1009 —	90 —	66 —	80 10	46 —	102 10	1845 —	6112 5	18336 15
—	2205 —	222 10	201 —	225 15	224 —	235 —	4500 —	11388 8	34015 4
—	1929 —	168 15	106 10	148 15	134 —	195 —	6040 —	10599 5	31797 5
—	1529 —	100 —	93 —	91 —	122 —	180 —	2695 —	6714 16	20144 8
—	1490 —	140 —	105 —	105 —	76 —	137 10	2445 —	5863 6	17589 18
10	1577 —	138 15	90 —	105 —	102 —	132 10	2145 —	6734 2	20202 6
10	136 —	11 5	10 10	5 5	14 —	12 10	215 —	1343 19	4031 17
10	1511 —	141 5	117 —	117 5	138 —	170 —	2965 —	7435 17	22307 11
—	1013 —	90 —	114 —	94 10	78 —	105 —	1800 —	4857 4	14571 12
—	130 —	12 10	7 10	5 5	8 —	7 10	205 —	1132 16	3398 8
10	745 —	93 15	46 10	80 10	58 —	85 —	1940 —	9707 3	29121 9
10	1764 —	217 10	102 —	154 —	114 —	162 10	4895 —	10866 19	32600 17
10	69418 —	6698 15	6099 —	6755 —	6818 —	8909 10	167870 —	396472 16	1,189,418 8



No. III. STATE of the Ships propoſed to be built, with the Sums abovementioned, on the Suppoſition that every Diſtrict that pays from 20 to 30,000*l.* is to have One or more Sail of the Line, in Proportion to the Sum it pays, named after it; all above 15,000*l.* a 50 Gun Ship; all above 10,000*l.* a 44 or 32 Gun Frigate; all above 5000*l.* a 24 Gun Frigate; and all under 5000*l.* Sloops, &c.

Diſtricts.	Sums propoſed to be raiſed in each Diſtrict in 3 Years.		Rate of Ship propoſed to be built.		
	£.	s.			
Middleſex	134294	14	3 Sail of the Line.		
Weſtminſter	96123	15	2 Sail of the Line.		
London	74408	14	2 Sail of the Line.		
York	72435	9	2 Sail of the Line.		
Kent	50552	5	1 Sail of the Line.		
Somerſet	42917	8	1 Ditto.		
Norfolk	39595	7	1 Ditto.		
Eſſex	38296	13	1 Ditto.		
Suffolk	34015	4	1 Ditto.		
Devon	32818	1	1 Ditto.		
Scotland	32600	17	1 Ditto.		
Lancaſter	32143	7	1 Ditto.		
Surrey	31797	15	1 Ditto.		
Wales	29121	9	1 Ditto.		
Southampton	26918	12	1 Ditto.		
Lincoln	25342	5	1 Ditto.		
Glouceſter	25028	18	1 Ditto.		
Wilts	22307	11	1 Ditto.		
Warwick	20202	6	1 Ditto.		
Suſſex	20144	8	1 Ditto.	Sail of the Line	25
Hertford	19193	5	1 Fifty-Gun Ship.		
Bedford	18336	15	1 Ditto.		
Southwark	17589	18	1 Ditto.		
Northampton	16834	4	1 Ditto.		
Berks	16521	15	1 Ditto.		
Cheſter	16487	8	1 Ditto.		
Salop	15612	3	1 Ditto.		
Oxford	15590	2	1 Ditto.	Fifty-Gun Ships	8
Cornwall	14637	—	1 Frigate of 44 or 32 Guns.		
Worceſter	14571	12	1 Ditto.		
Bucks	14081	11	1 Ditto.		
Northumberland	13807	19	1 Ditto.		
Dorſet	13562	14	1 Ditto.		
Leiceſter	12852	9	1 Ditto.		
Derby	12570	6	1 Ditto.		
Cambridge	12523	1	1 Ditto.		
Durham	11774	14	1 Ditto.		
Nottingham	10972	19	1 Ditto.		
Hereford	10863	12	1 Ditto.	Large Frigates	11
Cumberland	8206	16	1 Small Frigate or Sloop.		
Milford	7449	12	1 Ditto.		
Huntingdon	5041	4	1 Ditto.		
Weſtmoreland	4031	17	1 Ditto.		
Monmouth	3398	8	1 Ditto.		
Rutland	1833	—	1 Ditto.	Small Frigates and Sloops	6
Total Sum	1,189,418	8		Total Ships of War	50

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more ſlips, or that the expence is ſo enormous, that it is impoſſible for this nation to increaſe the number, however neceſſary it may be. How much therefore muſt the zealous public-ſpirited be aſtoniſhed to find, that this mighty bugbear is a trifling obſtacle ſo eaſily removed. If the want of ſlips is the only obſtruction to our regaining an undoubted ſuperiority at ſea, let us without delay ſet heartily about it, and, in leſs than three months, thirty, forty, or fifty ſlips may be conſtructed, for a ſum which, in a national view, cannot be accounted a very material object.

Some men are ſo ingenious at diſcovering impediments in the way of any farther naval exertions, that, though they confeſs the poſſibility of conſtructing ſlips at a ſmall expence, yet they doubt whether there be places along the extended coaſts of this iſland, with a depth of water ſufficient to launch a ſhip of the line. It ſeems unneceſſary, however, to dwell upon that point, as any perſon may find, upon enquiry, that there are places more than ſufficient

in the river Thames itſelf, to remove that viſionary objection.

A ſcarcity of ſhipwrights would be an evil indeed, if it were not eaſy to make the ſhipwrights we have in the King's yards work much more than they do at preſent, and were it not poſſible to add, with little difficulty, as many more as can be wanting *.

There is little doubt but means ſimilar to thoſe by which ſhipwrights in private yards were prevailed upon to build by taſk, or piece-work, might induce the King's ſhipwrights to follow their example; by which one third more work might be

* The following is an exact account of the number of ſhipwrights, &c. employed in the King's dock-yards, *anno* 1782, as laid before parliament.

Shipwrights in the King's dock-yards	2193
Caulkers in ditto	221
Servants to working ſhipwrights	297
Servants to working caulkers	119
	2830
Servants to the officers belonging to the King's yards, &c.	650
	3480

done

done in the ſame ſpace of time *. If that is not ſufficient, there ſurely can be no difficulty in increaſing the number of ſhip-carpenters. Ship-building is an art not very difficult to acquire; at leaſt, any other ſpecies of carpenter, under the ſuperintendance of an experienced ſhipwright, might ſoon be made capable of aſſiſting in the conſtruction of a ſhip. I know the prejudice which ſhipwrights have againſt thoſe, who have not ſerved what is called a regular apprentice-ſhip, to that branch of buſineſs. One reaſon for which is, that having apprentices is attended with ſome pecuniary emolument. On this objection and apparent obſtacle I would build the reſtoration of the Britiſh navy. There is not a ſhipwright, who would not be glad to have as many apprentices as might with propriety be allowed him. There is ſcarcely an individual of the many thouſands, who are ſpread all over the iſland,

* The wages of ſhipwrights in the King's dock-yards is only two ſhillings and a penny per day, with perquiſites, ſuppoſed to amount to 5d. more, and advantages in caſe of age or ſickneſs. In private yards they receive 3s. 6d. but when they work taſk or piece-work, they may earn from 5 to 8 ſhillings per day. This proves the great ſuperiority of of taſk-work for building quickly.

as houſe-carpenters, wheelwrights, cart-wrights, &c. who, by the certainty of ample wages, would not be prevailed upon to ſerve as apprentice, for a certain ſpace of time, under experienced ſhipwrights in the King's dock-yards. If theſe two principles are found, which I have every reaſon to believe is the caſe, where is the difficulty of increaſing the number of ſhipwrights to any amount that may be thought neceſſary?

Indeed, if the exiſtence of the country were to depend upon an immediate increaſe of its marine; and if this could not be procured by any other means, I ſhould conſider it to be not only juſtifiable, but even indiſpenſably neceſſary, to compel all our ſhipwrights to work in the King's dock-yards. In former times, that claſs of ſubjects was liable to be preſſed into the public ſervice, as ſeamen ſtill are; and ſurely never was a time, when ſuch a ſtep might be ſo eaſily vindicated. It is the leſs neceſſary, however, to take this plan into conſideration, as the ſhipwrights now in the King's yards, with the aſſiſtance of private builders, are in number fully ſufficient, if properly

properly employed, to build as many ſhips as can poſſibly be required; the author having it in his power to aſſert, upon the authority of that reſpectable ſhipbuilder Mr. Perry, that ſo ſmall a number as 30 ſhipwrights and 10 labourers, *when they work by the piece*, may conſtruct a 74 gun ſhip, if the timber is ſhaped and prepared for the purpoſe, in the ſhort ſpace of nine or ten months: 2000 ſhipwrights, therefore, might build, in one year, at leaſt 60 ſail of the line.

Indeed, if ſhips were wanted, why might not the plan be adopted of converting Eaſt Indiamen into ſhips of war? Thoſe Indiamen, it is true, whoſe decks are completed, cannot be made to carry more than 40 guns: but I aſſert it, on the moſt unqueſtionable authority, that ſuch as are not totally finiſhed, may be converted into 54 gun-ſhips*; and are equal in ſtrength, and in every reſpect fit to contend with the 60 gun-ſhips

* See farther obſervations upon this ſubject, in the public-ſpirited Letters addreſſed to Sir Thomas Charles Bunbury, Bart. by a Suffolk Freeholder.

of

of Spain, who, by the number of ſuch ſhips in their line, have ſo frequently deterred us from hazarding a cloſe engagement with the combined ſquadrons of the enemy.

But ſhips and men would be procured in vain, if a proper ſpirit cannot be excited among the officers of the navy; and ſome ſteps ought to be taken, to rouſe in them a more laudable ambition, than the paltry thirſt of prize-money. The idea of a naval order, which was principally intended for that purpoſe, I have already ventured to ſuggeſt. Were it divided into different claſſes, ſo that every individual, whatever his ſtation might be, who diſplayed peculiar courage and good conduct, were certain of being conſpicuouſly rewarded, I ſhould not deſpair of ſeeing our ſeamen elated with other events, beſide wealthy captures from the enemy. The following motion is ſubmitted to the conſideration of thoſe public-ſpirited members of the houſe, who wiſh to encourage ſtill greater exertions in the naval department.

" That

" That an humble addreſs be preſented
" to his Majeſty, earneſtly entreating his
" Majeſty to take into his royal conſider-
" ation, the propriety of conferring ſtill
" farther marks of his royal countenance
" and favour on the officers of his navy.

" That his faithful Commons, perfectly
" convinced how much his Majeſty de-
" lights to reward the merit of gallant
" men, and fully ſenſible that honorary
" diſtinctions, as marks of royal and of
" public approbation, muſt gratify the na-
" tural ambition of individuals of that de-
" ſcription, cannot ſee, without regret,
" that no *peculiar diſtinction* of that nature
" is appropriated for naval ſervices; though
" the navy of Great Britain is deſervedly
" accounted its greateſt glory, bulwark,
" and defence.

" That if it ſhould prove his Majeſty's
" moſt gracious pleaſure to inſtitute A NA-
" VAL ORDER, to reward the gallant
" atchievements of Britiſh ſailors, his
" faithful Commons will chearfully make

" good any expence attending ſuch an " inſtitution."

Here alſo it may be proper to remark, that though an increaſe of the navy, with the different plans above ſtated, muſt be ſome addition to the public expence, yet, that there is not ſo ample a field for economy in the ſtate, as the marine department. A commiſſion of accounts, to regulate our naval expences, would be a fortunate circumſtance indeed; and would put more into the pocket of the public, than any other plan of that nature, which has yet been ſuggeſted. When it is conſidered, that from the 1ſt of January 1776, to the 1ſt of January 1782, £48,963523 : 0 : 9¼ has been either voted for the fleet, or iſſued out in navy bills, every one muſt perceive, what a field there is for inveſtigation and economy.

It would be natural to conclude this tract, with offering ſome apology for the various defects which it contains, both in matter and in ſtyle. But it may be ſufficient

cient to remark, that it is written by one who does not profeſs to be either an author, or a ſeaman; but who wiſhed to aſſign the grounds upon which he founds his opinion, that if a bad peace is concluded, it ought not to be attributed, to any deficiency, in our NAVAL RESOURCES.

FINIS.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM